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Abstract—DNS tunneling techniques are often used for malicious 
purposes but network security mechanisms have struggled to 
detect these. Network forensic analysis has thus been used but 
has proved slow and effort intensive as Network Forensics 
Analysis Tools struggle to deal with undocumented or new 
network tunneling techniques. In this paper we present a method 
to aid forensic analysis through automating the inference of 
protocols tunneled within DNS tunneling techniques. We analyze 
the internal packet structure of DNS tunneling techniques and 
characterize the information entropy of different network 
protocols and their DNS tunneled equivalents. From this, we 
present our protocol prediction method that uses entropy 
distribution averaging. Finally we apply our method on a dataset 
to measure its performance and show that it has a prediction 
accuracy of 75%. Our method also preserves privacy as it does 
not parse the actual tunneled content, rather it only calculates the 
information entropy. 
Keywords-Network Forensics; DNS Tunneling; Malware 
Communication; Entropy; Traffic Classification;  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there has been an increase in the use of DNS 
tunneling to stealthily perpetrate malicious activity. This is 
often in the form of exfiltration of sensitive data, hiding of 
network attacks and the perpetuation of malware activities 
through botnet communication [1]. Several strains of malware 
such as the Morto worm [2], Feederbot [3] and variants of POS 
(Point Of Sale) malware such as the BernhardPOS and the 
FrameworkPOS malware [4] show the rise in popularity of this 
method of stealthy communication. The availability of several 
freely available tools for performing DNS tunneling (such as 
NSTX, Iodine, dnscat, DeNiSe OzymanDNS and Heyoka) [5] 
have also aided its popularity and uptake. 
Preventive measures fail at curtailing such breaches [4]. 
DNS tunneling detection mechanisms have been developed [6] 
[7], however they also struggle, discovering only 3% of attacks 
in sophisticated real world cases [4]. Work has been done to 
improve the detection of tunneling as is seen in [8] and [9], 
however despite these efforts, network breaches involving 
tunneling are still on the increase [4] [2].  
Reactive security mechanisms such as network security 
monitoring and network forensics analysis techniques offer 
some promise, however the process is often manual and effort 
intensive [10]. It also requires highly skilled expertise and is 
time-consuming, taking up to 7 months [4] [11]. Furthermore, 
current industry standard network forensics analysis tools only 
parse standardized network protocols. Previously unseen or 
undocumented network protocols common with DNS tunneling 
require manual dissection [10]. New and innovative methods to 
help alleviate these challenges in order to speed up the forensic 
analysis of tunneled network traffic are thus needed. 
In the network forensic analysis of tunneled networked 
traffic, it is of primary concern to identify the carrier tunneling 
protocol, the internally tunneled protocol, the communicating 
parties, the content that is being tunneled and its significance. 
Within our focus on DNS tunneling techniques, we assume that 
the identification of DNS tunneling has already been done, as 
there are studies such as [6] and [9] that demonstrate such 
methods. Thus we shift our focus to the next important process 
which is the discovery of the network protocol that is being 
carried internally within the DNS tunnel. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is an absence of studies 
done on the forensic analysis of DNS tunneling techniques. 
There has also been no work done on the identification of 
network protocols being tunneled within DNS tunnels. We thus 
focus on this area, developing a prediction mechanism to 
probabilistically identify network protocols carried within DNS 
tunnels. To this end, we hypothesize that individual network 
protocols inherently exhibit a specific entropy distribution in 
their byte contents in their normal usage. We further postulate 
that network protocols carried within tunneling mechanisms 
maintain some similarity to their original byte entropy 
distributions. This enables us to probabilistically match DNS 
tunneled traffic with reasonable accuracy to particular 
protocols matching the same distribution. 
As a starting point, we limit our study to the identification 
of two network protocols: HTTP and FTP, as tunneled 
individually by a single DNS tunneling tool. We also do not 
concern ourselves, for now, with the identification of the IP 
addresses of the communicating parties, nor the exact content 
being transmitted within the messages of the internally 
tunneled protocol. These are to be considered as future work. 
Additionally, for the sake of simplicity we focus on the popular 
Iodine DNS tunneling tool, though we believe that our idea can 
be similarly applied to other tools using different DNS 
tunneling methods. For the moment we do not deal with multi-
level nesting of tunneled protocols. We also do not deal with 
encrypted protocols carried within the tunneling protocol, nor 
tunneling protocols that inherently use encryption such as 
IPSec, SSH or SSL. The reason for this is that encryption 
methods aim at making information entropy uniform, per block 
or stream, such that different parts of the message are 
indistinguishable from each other. However, these are to be 
considered as future work. 
A network protocol prediction tool is built based on our 
theory. Initial outcomes from this tool show promising results 
with a prediction accuracy of 75% indicating a positive 
sentiment towards the development of our theory. Given the 
potential for large volumes of network traffic captures in 
today’s digital investigations, our protocol prediction tool 
could help speed up the triage process as well as the analysis of 
network traffic by helping forensic analysts to identify 
particular network flows where a certain suspect protocol may 
be present within network traffic, but is hidden in DNS 
tunneling techniques.  
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
Few studies have been performed to determine the 
protocols that are being carried within a tunneling protocol. In 
[12] traffic classification of protocols tunneled over SSL was 
performed using only the sizes of the first few packets of a 
given SSL session. They first identify SSL traffic from other 
normal traffic and then use a clustering mechanism based on 
Gaussian mixture models to distinguish between several 
protocols (including HTTP, FTP, BitTorrent, edonkey, SMTP, 
and POP3) tunneled over SSL. Statistical analysis of packet 
sizes and inter-arrival times were used in [13] to fingerprint 
normal SSH usage, and when SSH is used for tunneling other 
protocols. They extended their work in [14] to also distinguish 
HTTP tunneling from normal HTTP traffic, as well as to 
predict the presence of plaintext protocols such as POP3, 
SMTP, Chat and P2P protocols within both SSH and HTTP 
tunnels. Adaboost, C4.5 and Genetic Programming based 
classifiers were used in [15] to distinguish Skype and SSH 
traffic from other traffic, as well as to identify the type of 
application traffic (Shell, SFTP, SCP, Local /Remote 
Forwarding or X11) being tunneled in the SSH tunnel.  
Other notable studies have focused on identifying 
proprietary protocols such as Skype and Spotify among other 
network traffic. These studies include [16], [17] and [18]. In 
terms of content inference in tunnels, [19] attempted to extract 
exact key strokes from encrypted live SSH shell sessions.  
With regard to DNS tunneling techniques, most studies 
have focused only on detection. In [6] an n-gram character 
frequency analysis method for identifying domain names 
typical of DNS tunneling traffic was described. In [1] an 
anomaly detection method based on contrasting the statistical 
and information theoretic properties of the payload content of 
normal DNS traffic against that of DNS tunneling techniques 
was presented. Several DNS tunneling tools and detection 
heuristics are discussed in [9] including DNS request and 
response sizes, domain name entropy, use of uncommon 
Resource Records, the volume of DNS requests per IP address 
or per domain, the number of subdomains per domain, and 
presence of large numbers of orphaned DNS requests.  
Initial methods for manual disassembly of DNS tunneling 
traffic to recover the internally carried protocols and data are 
seen in [10]. To the best of our knowledge there are no studies 
on the automated prediction of network protocols tunneled 
within DNS tunneling traffic for the benefit of forensic 
analysis, thus we direct our efforts in this study towards this. 
III. DNS TUNNEL INTERNALS AND DATASET COLLECTION 
The flexibility of the DNS protocol allows DNS tunneling 
tools to use varying techniques [20]. Many tools append data as 
a subdomain in the name field of queries, though they also each 
have variations aimed at ease of use, increase in throughput or 
increased invisibility to security mechanisms. For example the 
“dns2tcp” tool uses TXT records; Iodine uses NULL records, 
while DNScat uses CNAME records. Iodine and Heyoka use 
EDNS(0) extensions in order to increase throughput [20]. 
A. Tunneling with IoD-ine (IP-Over-DNS) 
In this study we use the Iodine DNS tunneling tool due to 
its popularity, ease of use and availability of documentation 
[10]. Iodine encapsulates IPv4 packets into the payload of DNS 
packets. It uses NULL resource records by default, but can also 
use other resource records such as PRIVATE, TXT, SRV, MX, 
CNAME and A. The Query/Answer name field, within the 
particular Resource Record in use, holds the encapsulated data.  
Upstream data is GZIP compressed and encoded. Encoding 
options include Base32, Base64 (or Base64u) and Base128. 
This is determined through checking for character set support 
at intermediate DNS servers. Downstream data is transmitted 
as GZIP compressed raw IP packet bytes, if using NULL or 
PRIVATE resource records. If other resource records are used, 
then downstream data is GZIP compressed and encoded like 
upstream data [21]. If encoding is applied, then the 
downstream header is prepended with a specific ASCII 
character signifying the encoding type used. 
Tunneled data within the name field consists of a header 
and the fragment of the packet being tunneled, prepended as a 
sub-domain of the tunneling server. The header preceding the 
tunneled data contains metadata such as the user id, the codecs 
in use (Base32/64/128), the fragment size, the fragment 
number, the sequence number, whether compression is used 
and a Cache Miss Counter [21]. 
B. DNS Tunneling Setup and Dataset Capture 
As there are no well-known DNS tunneling network traffic 
captures available and it is difficult to obtain network traffic 
captures involving malicious DNS activity [22] we set up a 
DNS tunnel using the Iodine tool to create our own dataset. 
To create our DNS tunneled traffic dataset, we simulated 
the use of HTTP and FTP protocols individually, each within 
its own DNS tunnel. HTTP traffic over DNS was generated by 
performing simple web requests to 8 websites allowing for any 
additional requests for extra content (images, CSS, JavaScript, 
Ads) to ensue. For simulating the use of the FTP protocol we 
downloaded several files that we had placed on an FTP server 
prior to the experiments. In order to include some variation we 
ensured that the files downloaded were of different types 
including images, PDFs, text files, audio, video and ZIP files. 
The files downloaded were 12 in total and were stored at 
different paths on the FTP server. Summarily the dataset 
included 20 DNS tunneled traffic samples. 8 were of HTTP 
communication, each with one of the 8 specific websites. The 
other 12 were of FTP communication involving logins, 
directory traversals and individual file downloads. 
As a control dataset for comparison of the tunneled network 
protocols against their plain versions, we simulated normal 
HTTP web traffic and normal FTP traffic. The HTTP traffic 
was generated by visiting a randomly chosen website with a lot 
of content to be loaded. To generate normal FTP traffic we 
performed a login to an FTP server and sequentially 
downloaded 3 different files. We chose to use multiple files 
due to the terse nature of the FTP protocol commands. 
IV. PROTOCOL FEATURE TRENDS & ANALYSIS 
Our method for network protocol prediction is based on 
identifying patterns based on features found both in the plain 
protocol traffic that can be mapped to equivalent features in the 
DNS tunneled network traffic. Several features could be 
chosen to characterize the differences between protocols, and 
similarities across the plain and tunneled versions, including 
byte frequencies, information entropy and packet lengths. We 
chose to limit this study to the analysis of information entropy, 
as a starting point, as it is inherently tied to the actual data 
bytes composing packets. The idea is to observe normal traffic 
of particular protocols (HTTP and FTP in our case) and to 
make comparisons with their DNS tunneled equivalents that 
have been fragmented, encoded and compressed in the 
tunneling process. 
A. Experimenting with Information Entropy 
In characterizing features, measurements may be made at 
different levels of abstraction: At the IP packet level, the 
transport level or the application level. Differentiation may also 
be made between protocol client requests and server responses. 
Both HTTP and FTP protocols have a relatively small 
vocabulary of commands and content that goes into the 
requests; while their responses could include large amounts of 
data with great variation. We thus focus only on the requests of 
these protocols where the content and variation is more 
predictable and likely more significant for comparisons.  
Information entropy is a measure of the variation of the 
components that make up a message. In our case, we compute 
this on the bytes that make up a packet layer or field value. 
Entropy, as applied here, is calculated as the probability of a 
particular byte occurrence p(xi) multiplied by the logarithm of 
the probability of that occurrence, summed up for all byte 
occurrences. The mathematical formula is depicted below: 
 
The hypothesis behind the use of entropy is that the request 
packets for a particular protocol flow will produce a specific 
entropy distribution. We test this by creating a simple Python 
program (using the Scapy and Matplotlib libraries) to measure 
the information entropy feature and plot some charts for visual 
analysis of the distribution trends as seen in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) (i). HTTP Request App-Layer Entropy   (ii). FTP Request App-Layer Entropy 
        
b) (i). HTTP Request IP-Src Entropy   (ii). FTP Request IP-Src Entropy 
        
Figure 1.  Comparison of Packet Entropy at Different Abstraction levels for Different Protocols 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Comparison of Plain Network Protocols with Tunneled 
Equivalents 
Fig. 1(a)(i) and (ii) show the distributions of the entropy of 
the application layer requests of plain HTTP and FTP network 
traffic respectively. This is filtered through taking only the 
packets that contain application layer content and are destined 
to port 80 and port 21, for HTTP and FTP respectively. Thus 
there are no transport layer features present and thus no ACKs 
seen as these ACKs do not have any application layer content. 
Fig. 1(b)(i) and (ii) show entropy distributions at the IP 
packet level for plain HTTP and FTP traffic respectively. 
Filtering is performed at a more granular level where all IP 
traffic from the client is captured. The packet entropy 
distributions here contain both packets that contain application 
data and packets containing transport layer ACKs since both 
HTTP and FTP use TCP for the transport layer. These client 
ACKs acknowledge the receipt of prior Server S-ACKs that 
originated from the delivery of a request to the server 
Fig. 2(a)(i) and (ii) show the entropy distributions of HTTP 
over DNS traffic and FTP over DNS traffic respectively. They 
show the entropy of the Query Name field for DNS requests 
destined for the DNS port 53. As the filtering is based on the 
client side traffic destined for port 53, it includes both the 
tunneled application protocol request packets as well as those 
embodying transport layer properties, e.g. ACKs, sequencing 
and reliability information. Filtering is performed this way as 
there are no established methods for parsing and differentiating 
application layer data and other layers for DNS tunneled 
traffic. Moreover it also preserves privacy, as only calculations 
are performed over the packet content to generate metadata 
(entropy in this case), without necessarily making sense of the 
actual content.  
Given Base128 encoded traffic, which is the default used in 
Iodine, the theoretical maximum entropy for totally random 
data tends towards 8-bits. From the distributions in Fig. 1 and 
Fig. 2, there are variations seen between the protocols as well 
as between different layers of abstraction. The distributions are 
not uniformly distributed at the 8-bit value, evidencing an 
absence of absolute randomness. They also portray different 
patterns that may indicate the presence of a particular network 
protocol. 
In Fig. 1(a)(i) and (ii) the HTTP application layer traffic 
entropy values are seen to be significantly denser, than that of 
FTP traffic. The FTP traffic seems to have application layer 
packet entropy values around 4.5 and others around 2.5. HTTP 
application layer traffic seems to have most of its entropy 
values between 5.4 and 5.6. 
Similarly, in Fig. 1(b)(i) and (ii) the density of packets 
seems to be less with FTP traffic than with HTTP traffic. There 
seem to be 3 bands of clusters within the HTTP traffic, with the 
densest band being around the 4.9 to 5.3 entropy values. The 
other 2 bands are seen to be at around 4.6 and 5.8. With the 
FTP traffic there seems to be a single dense cluster of entropy 
values around the 4.8 mark. However one could also argue for 
2 more highly sparse clusters around the 5.4 and 4.5 entropy 
values. These sparse clusters may be significant when one 
looks across on the sequence of packets where we hypothesize 
the variances in entropy away from the 4.8 mark indicate the 
FTP requests initiating downloads for the 3 different files. 
With regard to the entropy values of HTTP over DNS 
traffic and FTP over DNS traffic depicted in Fig. 2(a)(i) and 
(ii), respectively, there is also some clustering. In the HTTP 
traffic, there seem to be 3 cluster bands. The densest is around 
5.6-5.8, the next less dense band is around the 6.5 value and the 
least dense seems to be around the 3.8-4.0 entropy range. For 
the FTP over DNS traffic seen in Fig. 2(a)(ii) there are 2 main 
clusters of entropy values. One band around the 5.6-5.8 range 
of entropy values and the other around the 3.8-4.0 range. 
Shorter message sizes or smaller alphabets result in smaller 
entropy values [3]. In the case of tunneled traffic with a fixed 
encoding of Base128, two types of traffic could consist of 
smaller entropy values due to shorter packet lengths. One is the 
ACKs from the transport layer. The second is the “ping” 
a) (i). HTTP-over-DNS Req (Query_name) Entropy  (ii). FTP-over-DNS Req (Query_name) Entropy 
        
 
Figure 2.  Comparison of Packet Entropy Values among Tunneled Protocols 
functionality often built into DNS tunneling tools to prevent 
DNS servers from timing out, by sending short query request 
messages periodically. 
We postulate that the bands in both Fig. 2(a)(i) and (ii) 
around the 4.0 value correspond to the entropy of the pings as 
they are shorter (less than 30 bytes) than ACKs (at least 40 
bytes) when seen in manual DNS tunneling disassembly. This 
is reinforced in that they are less dense in the HTTP traffic 
series due to the fact that a HTTP request can spawn several 
other HTTP requests to retrieve more content for the proper 
loading of a website. Thus the multitudes of HTTP requests 
keep the connection between the DNS tunneling client and the 
tunneling server open, corresponding to a lesser need for the 
pings to be generated for time-out prevention. 
The bands around 5.6-5.8 in both the tunneled HTTP traffic 
and FTP traffic seen in Fig. 2(a)(i) and (ii), respectively are 
likely ACKs from the transport layer. This deduction is made 
mainly from the HTTP over DNS traffic containing another 
band with higher entropy, which is likely the HTTP requests 
which are the longest resulting in higher entropy values. Also, 
the small repetitive pattern seen in the first 200 packets in Fig. 
2(a)(ii) seems to correspond to the action of the 3 file 
downloads. This leads us to believe that the band around the 
4.0 mark contains also the FTP request packets hidden among 
the same cluster with the “pings”. This is reinforced by the fact 
that the FTP commands making up the FTP requests are terse 
and have a fixed structure. This would contribute to a generally 
smaller entropy than HTTP requests that have a larger request 
header set and many more fields. 
Due to this clustering of different types of packets from the 
effect that their content and lengths have on the entropy, we 
deduce that there are inherent distributions that can help 
distinguish between DNS tunneled traffic containing different 
protocols. The different average values of the bands hints that 
the average entropy of a series of tunneled network traffic can 
help distinguish the internally tunneled protocols. From this we 
set out to explore whether these trends and the mean entropy 
values can help us identify internally tunneled protocols.  
V. PROTOCOL PREDICTION EXPERIMENTS 
Here, the dataset containing 20 test traffic captures and two 
ground truth captures are used to determine the similarity 
among the entropy distributions (variables) of plain network 
traffic of a particular protocol and its equivalent DNS tunneled 
versions. Intuitively, we use a simple similarity metric based on 
the averages of the distributions (variables). This metric was 
termed “MeanDiff”, which is the shortened form of “Mean 
Differences”. It is calculated simply as the absolute difference 
between the means of the two variables: 
 
The two variables being tested are: The entropy values of 
the ground truth protocol packet-capture (X) over time; and the 
entropy values of a given tunneled test capture (Y).  
A. Protocol Prediction Proof of Concept and Results 
A small proof-of-concept program was built to evaluate the 
suitability of the chosen similarity metric for predicting the 
underlying protocol of a given DNS tunneled network traffic 
capture. The scripts used for the classifier are made available 
online in a Github repository online [23].   
The proof of concept tool takes 2 ground truth traffic 
captures, each containing plain HTTP traffic and plain FTP 
traffic, respectively. It calculates the entropy values of each 
packet in the capture stream at the IP-packet level, generating 2 
entropy distributions: one for HTTP traffic and the other FTP 
traffic. The tool then accepts a DNS tunneled traffic capture 
whose internally tunneled protocol is unknown. Random 
sampling is performed selecting a consecutive series of entropy 
values from the DNS tunneling capture. The random sample 
series length is set at 90% of the length of the given ground 
truth capture being compared against. 1000 samples are taken 
and the MeanDiff metric is calculated for each sample against 
the respective HTTP and FTP entropy distribution. An average 
of the 1000 rounds is then taken as the MeanDiff score against 
the respective ground truth entropy distributions (HTTP and 
FTP) respectively for a given DNS tunneled sample. This score 
is used as the basis for prediction, where the MeanDiff metric 
is taken as a distance metric. The ground truth protocol with 
the smallest MeanDiff score is deemed to be closer to the test 
DNS tunneled traffic sample. This ground truth protocol is 
predicted as the internally carried protocol. 
This proof of concept tool was applied on the dataset and a 
sample run of the prediction results are shown in Table 1. 
TABLE I.  SAMPLE RUN RESULTS OF THE PROOF-OF-CONCEPT TOOL 
DNS Tunneled 
Test Sample 
True Value 
MeanDiff 
Prediction 
1[amazon] HTTP HTTP 
2[bbc] HTTP HTTP 
3[craigslist] HTTP FTP 
4[dsv.su.se] HTTP HTTP 
5[en.wikipedia] HTTP HTTP 
6[facebook] HTTP HTTP 
7[google] HTTP FTP 
8[youtube] HTTP FTP 
9[audio-wav] FTP HTTP 
10[audio-mp3] FTP HTTP 
11[img-jpg1] FTP FTP 
12[img-jpg2] FTP FTP 
13[img-png1] FTP FTP 
14[img-png2] FTP FTP 
15[pdf1] FTP FTP 
16[pdf2] FTP FTP 
17[txt1] FTP FTP 
18[txt2] FTP FTP 
19[video] FTP FTP 
20[zipfile] FTP FTP 
Percentage Correct (Accuracy): (15/20) = 75% 
B. Discussion 
The MeanDiff metric in Table 1 shows a prediction 
accuracy of approximately 75%. Subsequent runs have shown 
results within the range of 70-80 percent prediction accuracy, 
showing promise for protocol prediction within DNS tunneled 
traffic. Here we also see that 5 out of the 8 HTTP over DNS 
test samples were classified correctly indicating a 62.5% recall 
(true-positive) rate, while 10 out of 12 FTP over DNS test 
samples were classified correctly indicating an 83.3% recall. 
The performance of the classifier is summarized in the 
confusion matrix in Table II. 
TABLE II.  POC CLASSIFIER PERFORMANCE CONFUSION MATRIX 
N=20 
Predicted 
HTTP FTP 
Actual 
HTTP 5 3 
FTP 2 10 
 
The Misclassification Rate is seen to be 25%. The 
Precision for FTP is seen to be 76.9%, while for HTTP it is 
seen to be 71.4%. The False Positive Rate for the FTP class is 
seen to be 16.7%, while for the HTTP class it is seen to be 
37.5%. These measures of the effectiveness of the classifier 
indicate positive results for the prediction of underlying 
network protocols in DNS tunnels. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this study we considered the challenge of predicting the 
underlying application protocols tunneled within DNS traffic. 
The internal structure of DNS tunneling techniques was 
explored leading to the identification of a theory that the 
entropy distributions of the packet bytes can help characterize 
and predict the internally tunneled protocol. Packet traces were 
visualized in order to identify patterns emanating from 
different types of packets due to their content and function. A 
small dataset of DNS tunneled traffic was created, and proof of 
concept classifier was developed in order to test our theory. 
The classifier, based on the averages of the entropy values, 
showed a prediction accuracy of 75%, indicating a promising 
outlook for our theory. 
Given the increasing use of DNS tunneling in security 
breaches this method aims to aid forensics practitioners to 
triage and identify DNS tunneling network traffic that may 
contain particular protocols of interest helping them focus on 
particular DNS tunnel flows and reducing the burden of having 
to analyze all DNS tunneled traffic. 
From this study we provide initial results into the study of 
the relatively unexplored field of forensics on DNS tunneled 
network traffic. We provide a simple novel method of 
prediction of the internally tunneled network protocols within 
DNS tunneled traffic. Though 75% prediction accuracy is 
good, further improvements can be made to enhance this. One 
way to improve this could be to involve more features for the 
classification task. We only focused on information entropy 
while other features of the tunneled network traffic such as 
packet lengths, inter arrival times and character n-grams may 
also be analyzed in future studies. A wider analysis into other 
DNS tunneling techniques and more candidate internally 
tunneled protocols (plain, or encrypted) could help identify 
these. Also, other statistical metrics may offer finer grained 
differentiation and should be explored. Finally, machine 
learning and data mining techniques can also be explored to see 
if they provide better classification. We are presently looking 
into this, focusing particularly on Dynamic Time Warping in 
the field of time series analysis in order to find new ways to 
match the plain ground truth protocols against their DNS 
tunneled variants. 
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